Interpreting the Constitutional Court’s Decision

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia (MK) has just announced its verdict on two regulations in Law No. 8 of 2012 on General Elections to elect Members of Parliament at the national (DPR), provincial (DPRD Provinsi), as well as district or municipality level (DPRD Kabupaten/ Kota). The first verdict is that all political parties, including already existing ones, must pass a verification process set by the General Election Commission (KPU) in order to compete in the next election. Secondly, the 3.5 percent Parliamentary threshold (PT) will only be applicable for DPR but not for both DPRD Provinsi and Kabupaten/Kota.

This article argues that the Court’s decision is vital in supporting Indonesia’s democratic consolidation process. In particular, the decision will improve not only the quality of the party system, which will improve party institutionalization, thus strengthening the linkage between voters and political parties.

Equal and fair verification process

There are three reasons for why all parties should undergo the verification process. First, it encourages political parties to improve party institutionalization. With this requirement, political parties will have to prove that they are maintaining their “systemness”, which according to Randall and Svåsand (2002) is “… the increasing scope, density, and regularity of the interactions that constitute the party as a structure.” It requires existing political parties to build better party machinery and circumvent the skeletal-survivability strategy as commonly practiced. However, this verification is only tackling one of the issues in party institutionalization. The other factors, including value infusion, decisional autonomy, and reification, will need more than a verification process.

The second reason is that the verification process provides a fair barrier for opportunistic political entrepreneurs to make new parties every election with insignificant public support. In the new election law, the requirements for a political party to be able to compete in the next election are more stringent than the previous law. For instance, the requirement for a political party to have structural branches with higher magnitude, which varies from the national to sub-district level, is actually difficult to achieve for a party without deep-rooted support and vast resources. Subsequently, a political party with a good party institutionalization should not be worried about this regulation, because it will be easy for the party to surpass the requirement. However, one should note that the effectiveness of the verification process as a barrier for political entrepreneurs will depend on the performance of the General Election Committee (KPU).

The third reason, as argued by the Court, is that it provides an equal playing field for all political parties. Non-discriminatory treatment to all subjects of democracy is an essential value of a democratic system. The Court has correctly pointed out that it would be unfair if the existing parties do not have to go through the verification because, as mentioned earlier, the requirement in the new law is more stringent.

A dilemma between proportionality and simplification of party system

Regarding the PT, the Court annulled the regulation for the implementation of 3.5 percent PT at the DPRD level, as well as at both provincial and district/ municipality level. However, the 3.5 percent PT for the DPR is still applicable. The Court argued that it understands that PT is necessary to simplify the party system. However, Indonesian plurality and political aspirations at the regional level are also important and must to be taken into account.

            Ideally, there should be no PT at both the national and regional levels because the verification process ought to simplify the party system. Again, only parties with good institutionalization and sufficient resources can compete in elections. One should remember that the requirement for a party to enter elections is applied both at the national and regional level. Thus, only parties with national coverage can also compete at the regional level. Subsequently, it will discourage minor parties from entering elections, not because of discrimination of PT, but because they cannot pass the requirements in verification process.

However, the Court’s decision on PT should be appreciated as an effort to accommodate both interests. By allowing a PT of 3.5 percent at the national level, it will become a filter for smaller parties that only have strong bases in several areas but do not have nation-wide support. At the same time, smaller parties will still be able to represent their strong bases at the regional Parliament, which is more relevant with regard to their ties and proximity with their bases of support at that particular region.

In this context, it supports one of the vital elements of democracy, which is interest optimization. Alan Ware (1987) suggested that formal arrangement in a democracy should optimally correspond to the interests of the largest number of people in the relevant arena. The DPR and DPRD operate on different levels. Therefore, the degree of representativeness between both institutions is also different. A strong party at the regional level in each particular province or district/municipality does not necessarily represent the interests of the voters at the national level. Therefore, the application of PT for DPR is acceptable.

Endnote

The MK’s verdict has the potential to improve the stability of the party system in Indonesia. More importantly, it could also improve the linkage between political parties and their voters, who are constantly being questioned in Indonesia’s multiparty system in the post-Suharto era.

However, despite the efforts to improve the quality of electoral laws and system by the MK, DPR, the Government, and civil societies, the KPU as the executioner plays a vital role in determining the quality of elections in Indonesia.

Indonesia’s electoral law might be one of most complicated laws in the world. Despite its shortcomings, current electoral laws are suitable for a country like Indonesia. Maybe now is the time for the world to learn from Indonesia.

Yoes C. Kenawas is a graduate student and research analyst at the Indonesia Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of InternationalStudies (RSIS), Singapore. The opinions expressed are his own.

Which one threatens the state, Lady Gaga or hardliners?

The Jakarta Post Tue, May 22 2012

The National Police (Polri) stated that they would not issue a permit for Lady Gaga’s concert scheduled for Jakarta on June 3, 2012, for, among other reasons, fears that the Grammy Award winner would exploit her sensuality in a manner which could harm the moral of Indonesian youths.

This statement is more or less in line with the same tune as that of the Islam Defenders Front (FPI), which previously said that Lady Gaga would “bring the faith of Satan to the country and thus would destroy the nation’s morals” (The Jakarta Post, May 16, 2012). 

Whether the police’s decision is right or wrong does not matter. The most serious problem, however, lies in the fact that a small group of people can influence the process of interpreting threats within a state institution like the police by using their “religious” agenda. It is interesting to notice that in post-Soeharto Indonesia, state institutions are submissive, if not controlled, by some hard-line groups in this republic. 

In a democratic country, the power of the state comes from the people’s votes through elections. In this context, the state should never discriminate against its citizens when a conflict erupts between such groups. Instead, the state remains neutral and adherent to the Constitution and law when managing the differences among conflicting parties. The state, through law enforcement institutions, has the power to maintain public order and security, enforce the law, provide protection and serve the public interests. State institutions have the mandate to take action to keep the public interests from all forms of threat.

There are several types of threats, namely direct and indirect as well as actual and potential threats. However, threats are also about perception, particularly if we talk about threats on the level of concepts or ideas. 

Because the public is not a single entity, threats directed at a particular group are not necessarily a threat against another group. In this case, the law enforcement agencies, e.g., the police, should carefully assess each type of threat, whether actual or potential, direct or indirect; which party or group that will be harmed by the threat; and how it will affect society as a whole. Therefore, they can take necessary actions based on the threat assessment. Nevertheless, the police must handle each assessment in a careful manner. Miscalculating the threat could send the wrong signal to the general public.

In the case of Lady Gaga’s concert and Irshad Manji’s book launching, as well as in other cases such as GKI Yasmin Christian congregation or Ahmadiyah Islamic minority sect, state institutions seemed to fall under the influence or are unable to deal with threats that come from religious hardliner groups. 

In those cases, the hardliner groups clearly stated that they would launch physical attacks on other parties. Through their actions, the hardliners were actually presenting more potential, and in some cases, actual threats to other groups. 

The irony, however, is that state institutions, which ideally must stay neutral to protect the well-being of all people, are aligning with the hardliner groups. Instead of overcoming potential threats, the state apparatus chooses to cooperate with the side that has launched the threat. 

The state in post-Soeharto Indonesia has been co-opted by some groups that are capable of influencing state policy through various means, including threats.

It is indeed the irony of democracy that they freely increase their power and consequently influence and determine the state’s policy. The most concerning issue is not necessarily their threat to attack others, but their attack on the freedom of expression and pluralism, which characterizes the nation.

Worse, they can promote their agenda by intimidating the state. If the state does not comply with their demands, for example, the ban against Lady Gaga’s performance, they will not hesitate to intimidate others, including state institutions. 

For whatever reason, including maintenance of public order, the police’s option to accommodate the threat rather than to overcome it is a stark display of a thug-controlled state. It constitutes the tyranny of a minority over the majority. In the end, it will jeopardize Indonesia’s reputation as a democracy. Indonesia’s billing as the third largest democracy in the world will be just a myth, or actually, democracy is already new myth of Indonesia. 

Indonesia today is watching the radical groups win another battle-of-discourse over those who are supporting democracy, freedom of speech and plurality. The country needs someone like Gus Dur who dared to challenge the hardliner’s agenda. 

As long as the state complies with particular groups’ agenda, then it is hard to deny that Indonesia is transforming into a homogenous society. It depends on Indonesian society whether or not they are determined to advance plurality. 

The writer is a post-graduate student at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Jakarta Election and Indonesia in 2014: An Election Reflection

Synopsis

The first round of Jakarta gubernatorial election has just ended. There are several crucial issues in this stage, which can give us a preview of the 2014 election in Indonesia.

Commentary

On 11 July 2012, Jakarta residents voted for Jakarta’s Governor for the next five years. Based on the final vote tabulations by the Jakarta General Election Commission (KPUD Jakarta), the pair of Surakarta Mayor Joko Widodo (Jokowi) - Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) finished at the first place, followed by the incumbent Fauzi Bowo (Foke) – Nachrowi Ramli (Nara) with about 1.8 million votes and 1.4 million votes subsequently. Yet, none of them was able to get the majority votes. Thus, they will compete in the runoff on 21 September 2012.

However, there are several lessons that we can learn from the first round, primarily in the light of Indonesian legislative and presidential election in 2014.

Weak party, more personal appeal

First, there is an indication that both in Jakarta and at the national level, political parties’ machinery remains ineffective in mobilizing voters. Although the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP) and the Indonesia Greater Movement Party (Gerindra) claimed that their cadres were working very hard to mobilize voters, one could suggest that it is Jokowi’s low-profile character which, supported by extensive media coverage, was the key factor in his success. However, based on the exit poll, we cannot just ignore the role of the PDIP and Gerindra, whereby about 79 percent of voters for both parties voted for Jokowi - Ahok.

Nevertheless, weak party machinery was observable with other political party-backed candidates. 44.9 percent of the Democratic Party (PD) voters voted for other candidates, not for the pair of Foke-Nara. The most evident is the pair of Alex Noerdin - Nono Sampono, whereby only 19 percent of Golkar’s voters voted for them, while the rest of the party’s voters voted for other candidates.

In other words, personal appeal is still playing a great role in the success of candidates rather than strong party machinery or programmatic approach. It is related to the issue of party institutionalization. Declining party ID, weak party machinery, and public pragmatism have contributed toward the emergence of this characteristic.

National-level leadership: out of stock

The second issue related to the issue of the number of high-qualified potential leaders. In Jakarta elections, there are six pairs of candidates competing to become the Governor of Jakarta. Apart from the incumbent, all of the candidates are “new faces” to Jakarta residents.  They all have, arguably, the best qualities to lead a very dynamic province like Jakarta. The incumbent, Fauzi Bowo, is an experienced bureaucrat who served his entire career in Jakarta. The contenders, Joko Widodo is a candidate for World’s Best Mayor; Hidayat Nurwahid is a statesman who once led the National Consultative Assembly (MPR); Faisal Basri is a leading yet humble economist, well known for his ability to conceptualize ideas and translate them into practical solutions; Alex Noerdin is the Governor of South Sumatera who is able to carry out various monumental projects; and Hendardji Soepandji is a former military general with a good track record, well known for being clean and idealist. Those candidates are crème de la crème and have the potential to carry out their duties as the leader of Jakarta.

On the contrary, at the national level, Indonesia seems to be running out of stock of national leadership. Most of the candidates are “old faces” that already existed since the New Order era. Some of the names that appeared in some surveys ran in the previous presidential elections. Some others even have direct relations with previous or current leaders. As for new faces such as the State Owned Enterprises Minister Dahlan Iskan or Coordinating Minister for Politics, Legal, and Security Affairs Djoko Suyanto, despite appearing in the surveys, these leaders still have a low level of popularity amongst Indonesian. It would be best if Indonesia could follow the case of Jakarta, whereby the best talent and new faces are daring enough to compete in the election.

Election management: same old song

By reflecting on the Jakarta election, Indonesia is still coping with critical issues regarding election management quality. The issue of voter lists is the most important among others. Even for a major city like Jakarta, voter lists are still disorganized and have rendered many eligible voters unable to enjoy their constitutional rights. It is a continuing issue, which happens from one election to another both at the regional and national level.

The Jakarta election could be very good evaluation material for the National Election Commission (KPU) to overcome their shortcomings in the next two years, leading to a better election in 2014 than in 2009. The implementation of the electronic identification card (E-KTP) could be helpful to minimize voter lists issue in the next election.

Political marketing: going digital

The fourth issue is related with the utilization of social media in political campaign. From Jakarta election we can see an increasing trend of using the social media platforms as a contrivance for candidates to promote their programs, create a good image, or even using it to launch black campaign against the competitors. It happens particularly in the Twitter.

It also became the impetus for the birth of new actors in shaping the political discourse, which commonly called as celebritweet or celebtwit (celebrity on Twitter). To put it short, they are some accounts on Twitter who has high number of followers and acting as like a marketing buzzer. Some of them are personal accounts and others are pseudonym accounts, who managed by one or several people. Some of them are voluntarily basis; some others are professionally paid “social media consultants.”

Although it is too early to conclude that they significantly influenced the campaign, but the trend shows that it is crucial for candidates to run their campaign on the social media. It is relevant due to increasing number of social media and internet user in Indonesia. Therefore, in 2014, although the backbone of political marketing is still the traditional media outlets, but there is a tendency that social media will play a greater role in shaping the dynamics in a political campaign in Indonesia.

Yoes C. Kenawas is a Research Analyst at the IndonesiaProgramme of the S. Rajaratnam of International Studies, Singapore.

Political Islam in Indonesia: More Conservative, But Not Necessarily Support Neo-Islamist

This article is a response to Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman's article titled "The Future of Islamism in Indonesia: Neo-or- post Islamism?” Mr. Osman's article has carefully analyzed the current situation of Islamism in Indonesia and positively contributed to the discussion of political Islam in the world's largest Muslim country. Furthermore, he has argued that neo-Islamist movements, led by HTI and FUI, would continue to grow in Indonesia because of their ability in building social capital amongst state institutions as well as in attracting young Islamists who are "disappointed" by compromises made by Islamist political parties.

However, before we conclude that neo-Islamist movements will continue to grow and reshape Indonesia’s political scene, several considerations must be taken into account. This will provide us with a more comprehensive perspective for analyzing this development.  

Declining Electoral Support, Increasing Conservatism

Saiful Mujani and William R. Liddle have argued that electoral support towards Islamic political parties in Indonesia is declining from one election to another. One can see the decline by looking at Islamic political party support over the last two election cycles, whereby support towards all Islamic political parties in the 2004 and 2009 elections were only 40 percent and 25 percent respectively. The latest survey conducted by CSIS in January 2012 shows that support toward Islamic political parties such as the Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) is declining significantly from 7.8 percent to only 3.1 percent. The same is happening with the United Development Party (PPP).

However, as argued by Anies Baswedan and Sunny Tanuwidjadja, while electoral support towards Islamic political parties is declining, political Islam has actually been rising in recent years. There is a penetration of Islamic forces into so-called nationalist, secular, and Pancasila-based political parties. For example, most of these political parties have recently supported a number of laws that contain Islamic values, both at the national and regional level.

Furthermore, recent events in Indonesia have also indicated that the penetration of political Islam is increasing and is able to force the government to accommodate their demands. Irshad Manji’s book tour, Lady Gaga’s concert, the Cikeusik Massacre, and the Yasmin Congregation’s church are all examples showing that the government is willing to make compromises to meet demands of several hardliner groups in Indonesia. The joint ministerial decree on the Ahmadiyah is an example whereby the government has bent under pressure of Islamic hardliner groups.

Additionally, the Jakarta Post also reported that according to the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), trends show that radicals have gained positions in mosque management, which have traditionally been held by followers of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Moreover, the survey by the Institution for Islam and Peace Studies (LaKIP) also shows that there are significant numbers of Indonesian students who were willing to become involved in acts of religious violence as well as in vandalizing houses of worship of other religious believers.

These facts confirm that Indonesian Muslims are becoming more conservative. Nevertheless, does this support the claim that Neo-Islamist groups are also increasing in Indonesia?

Several Considerations

Before we answer that question, there are several factors that need to be taken into account regarding whom Muslims in Indonesia will channel their supports to in order to accommodate its values and demands.

First, the phenomenon of declining party ID is not solely the problem of Islamist political parties. Current trends show that party ID is declining in most political parties in Indonesia. It is also indicated in the number of swing voters in Indonesia. CSIS' survey shows that there are 48.4 percent voters who have not decided yet which party that they will select if elections were to be held today.

Political parties have disappointed Indonesian voters due to corruption and scandals that implicated their cadres. Based on LSI’s survey in December 2011, political parties were viewed as the most corrupt political institution in Indonesia – a factor that lowers party ID. Some scandals also involved several politicians from Islamic political parties. For example the case of Arifinto (PKS) who was caught on camera watching a pornographic video during the plenary session, or the case of Misbakhun, also from PKS, who was found guilty of crafting a fictitious mortgage letter to obtain credit.

Second, when they lost their confidence in political parties, there are other alternatives for Muslims in Indonesia to channel their voices other than through neo-Islamist groups. In this case, we will be focusing on the voters of Islamic political parties. First, as suggested by Mr. Osman, voters may go to organizations such as FUI or HTI. However, we also should bear in mind that there are also other more moderate organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah where Muslims can channel their aspirations. Second, the voters might choose other political parties which suit their values, needs, aspirations or simply because of the personal appeal of the party’s leader. This could mean that they would choose non-Islamic parties or secular-nationalist political parties. Third, they may not use their right to vote and become passive during the election, becoming what is known as golput (white group) in Indonesia.

Third, we also have to consider the fact that youth are not overly interested in politics. A survey conducted by LSI, Goethe Institut, and Friedrich Naumann Foundation shows that the majority of Muslim youths are not interested in politics. Nevertheless, they also show a high degree of trust in democracy and democratic institutions, which could mean democracy, is seen as the only game in town. Changes should be done in a democratic way.

Although the social pendulum is moving towards a more conservative stance, Indonesian Muslims are still in the moderate quadrant. As long as nationalist political parties and leaders still accommodate some Islamic values and can present strong governance and leadership, the issue of establishing an Islamic country is no longer relevant for Muslims in Indonesia. They might be more conservative, but not necessarily want to change the country’s ideology and turn Indonesia into an Islamic state.

Yoes C. Kenawas is a Research Analyst at the Indonesia Programme of the S. Rajaratnam ofInternational Studies, Singapore. 

Indonesia’s Political Outlook 2012

By Leonard C. Sebastian and Yoes C. Kenawas   

    

Synopsis

The major political events that dominated the news in 2011 are likely to continue to shape Indonesian politics in 2012. Election law reform and prospective candidates for the 2014 presidential election will draw most attention.                                                                

Commentary

2011 WAS a challenging year for the SBY administration. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had to deal with a fragile political coalition under the auspices of a Joint Secretariat (Sekber). This coalition remains tenuous primarily because its pivotal members, the Golkar Party and the Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS), behave more like opposition parties than committed members of a coalition.

The fractious nature of the coalition was particularly evident prior to a mid-October 2011 cabinet reshuffle and further manifested in high profile corruption cases that tarnished the image of President Yudhoyono and discredited the Democrat Party (PD). It created a mutual-hostage situation among political parties as well as between the executive and legislative where neither was able to take excessive advantage of each other.   

Political trends for 2012

If the representatives of the political parties in Cabinet gave the impression that they supported the President’s policy initiatives, they did little to constrain their political party colleagues who sought to undermine him in Parliament. Yudhoyono has limited options to deal with this situation as he still needs support from these political parties to find the compromises necessary to ensure he leaves behind a credible legacy when  his presidency ends in 2014.

Political trends evident in 2011 will recur in 2012. The Joint Secretariat will remain an unreliable coalition. Golkar, PKS, and to some extent the United Development Party (PPP), will continue to play hardball on several unresolved issues, particularly the corruption scandals surrounding former PD treasurer M. Nazaruddin and the Bank Century case. These political risks will be exploited by the opposition Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan/PDIP), and by members of Yudhoyono’s coalition when they find it expedient to engineer political instability, thereby further compromising PD’s image among the electorate.

A corruption case which involved the bribing of most of Parliament’s finance commission to appoint Ms. Miranda Goeltom as a Senior Deputy Governor of Bank Indonesia in 2004 has entered a new phase with the recent arrest of businesswoman Nunun Nurbaeti in late 2011. This case is crucial owing  to its links with members of political parties, particularly PKS and the PDI-P. This situation provides the perfect window of opportunity for PD to strike back. 

Given the coalition’s shaky foundations, there  might be a possible overhaul of the coalition in 2012, initiated by Golkar and PKS. This is primarily because they hold the advantage, or to use the Bahasa Indonesia term - berada diatas angin.

Key Issues in 2012         

Debates on election law reform, particularly the minimum parliamentary threshold (PT), will be a major point of contention. While the big political parties PD, Golkar, PDIP want to raise the minimum threshold to four to five percent, PKS, the National Mandate Party (PAN), the National Awakening Party (PKB), PPP and other smaller parties want to retain the minimum threshold at three percent to make it easier for themselves to contest. PD is placed in a dilemma since the majority of its coalition partners come from smaller parties like PAN, PKB, and PPP. PD’s actions will determine whether loyalists like PAN would be forced to disengage from the current coalition. 

In 2012, more aspirants may announce their candidacy for the 2014 presidential election. Thus far, only Golkar Chair Aburizal Bakrie and PAN Chair Hatta Rajasa (the Coordinating Minister for the Economy and President Yudhoyono’s in-law) have accepted their party’s nomination. PD will likely keep its options open, possibly taking their cue from Yudhoyono on his preferred successor. PDIP’s position remains ambiguous. Will the party nominate former president Megawati Sukarnoputri or her daughter Puan Maharani? The Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) is likely to nominate its chairman, Prabowo Subianto.

Beyond the national political stage, there are a few key political developments in 2012 that merit attention. The first is the gubernatorial election in Jakarta and Aceh. The former is important because it involves the election of leaders of the nation’s capital, receives wide media coverage, and is a national barometer of other local elections. It will be ominous for the other provinces if the Jakarta race is compromised either through an inability to resolve election-related conflict, maintain security, or manage the electoral process.

Controversy surrounding the Aceh gubernatorial election was already evident in 2011. There was political tension between the Aceh Party (Partai Aceh) and incumbent Governor Irwandi Yusuf over a Constitutional Court decision.

The Constitutional Court annulled an Aceh special local Administration Law (Qanun) prohibiting independent candidates to run in the upcoming election. The Qanun promulgated in 2006 served to facilitate former Free Aceh Movement (GAM) members to contest in the 2006 election. According to the Qanun, independent candidates were only allowed to compete in the 2006 direct election when Aceh did not have local political parties. Currently, the local-based Partai Aceh asserts that Aceh has its own special Administration Law which is different from national law owing to the special status of Aceh. Partai Aceh maintains that the Aceh chapter of the General Election Commission should refer to that special Law, prohibiting independent candidates from running in the next election.

Aceh’s local regulations made to facilitate GAM’s requirements are in contradiction of national law. Consequently, security disturbances in the election and post-election phases remain a distinct possibility. If peace is to be maintained, Acehnese elites will need to exercise political maturity while the central government and the security forces must aim to manage the situation well. 

Complicated and Challenging       

The second issue is the performance of newly-elected commissioners of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), under its new head, Abraham Samad, who  was not a popular choice. It is rumoured  that the DPR or Parliament chose him to weaken the Commission. Will the new chairman be able to override public doubts about his capabilities and more importantly, have the courage to deal with high-profile corruption cases?

The third issue is the selection of the new commissioners for the General Election Commission (KPU) who are to take charge of the 2014 presidential and legislative elections. These commissioners must improve on the 2014 election given the controversies surrounding the election.

Had President Yudhoyono not won decisively in 2009, a national crisis would have arisen over the widespread allegations of election fraud. Political interests of the elite will play a crucial role in the selection process, which is likely to be complicated and challenging.


Leonard C. Sebastian is an Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Indonesia Programme and Yoes C. Kenawas is a programme Research Associate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University


*Published by Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Political Dynasties in Indonesia: What Went Wrong?

As predicted, several Indonesian survey institutions announced that the pair of Ratu Atut Choisiah (incumbent) – Rano Karno (deputy regent of Tangerang) would win the 2011 Banten gubernatorial election. At the time this article is written, the Provincial General Election Commission has yet to announce the final result of the election.

However, the return of Ratu Atut to political office raises concerns about the monopoly of power concentrated in small groups of elite. Ratu Atut’s relatives hold several key public positions throughout Banten province. Furthermore, it raises the issue of political dynasties in post-Suharto Indonesia.  Banten is not exclusive, but the pattern is also evident in other provinces and at the national level. Dynastic politicians have occupied key positions in the public office positions as well as within the political party structure.

Political dynasty is, in fact, not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Families such as the Sukarnos and Suhartos were very dominant in Indonesia politics. However, currently more families are rising at the national and local political stage.

The proliferation of political dynasties in Indonesia is inevitable. In a democratic society like India, the Philippines, including Indonesia the issue is not about how we prevent the formation of political dynasties, but how we prevent them from violating principles of democracy when obtaining political positions. In countries like Indonesia, the issue of political dynasties formation becomes more important because it could jeopardize the prospect of democratic consolidation. In addition, in the situation where there are pervasive structural defects in the current democracy practice, this phenomenon is not favorable to make Indonesian democracy become more mature in the long run. It could setback the ongoing process because public’s expectation towards a more equal distribution of power, after a long period of centralized authoritarian government, could be distorted. Optimism could turn into pessimism.

According to Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder (2009), democracy, in fact, provides the ground for political elites to centralize power in small groups of people. In a democratic society, each citizen has the same rights to pursue one’s political objectives. Better political capital, such as extensive elite and grassroots networks, brand name recognition, and presumably, opportunity to exploit public budget and facilities for their campaigns, provides a better chance for those dynastic politicians to defeat their non-dynastic competitors.

It is indeed an irony that democracy, allows centralization of power in small groups of elite. It opposes the original idea of democracy, which seeks to avoid power agglomeration in small groups of people. Democratic transformation, followed by democratic consolidation, are expected to prevent centralization of power in one or small of groups of political elite i.e. oligarchs. Having said that, what went wrong?

In fact, there is nothing wrong with the creation of political dynasties. It is inevitable and not against the principle of democracy as long as contending politicians respect the essential values of democracy. The problem arises when the process to form dynasties violates other principles of democracy. Therefore, there are three issues that need to be addressed in order to prevent dynastic politicians from violating democratic principles.

First, political parties are responsible to select and nominate its best cadre to compete in the election. Good selection and monitoring mechanisms of political parties will be beneficial not only to the voter but also, in the long-run, to the party itself. It will become the first controlling mechanism to prevent dynastic politicians to violate democratic principle. Therefore, political parties need to strengthen the mechanism of caderisation.

However, looking at current condition of political parties in Indonesia, whereby money politics and patron-client relations are still the main features in their political decision making, it would hard to see any progress in developing control mechanism in foreseeable future. In addition, it will only be effective if dynastic politicians use party as its main vehicle to nominate him/her. It will be useless if dynastic politicians choose to run as independent candidate. It leads us to see other available alternatives to prevent dynastic politicians to undermine the principles of democracy.

Minimum requirement for democracy is the presence of free and fair elections. Indonesia has conducted three general elections (including two direct presidential elections) and numerous local level elections. However, the fairness of those elections remain questioned. In 2010, the Constitutional Court handled 230 election disputes out of 240 elections across Indonesia. Many of them related to money politics, public official mobilization, to final voter register fraud.

In this sense, strengthening the coordination among the Election Oversight Committee, Election Commission and Indonesian police, both at national and local level, is vital and urgent. These agencies, must take serious action toward election frauds, which are potentially conducted by all competing candidates. However, due to the incumbency status and distinctive advantages of dynastic politicians, related agencies need to be more aware to potential violations they may conduct. Law enforcement is a feasible alternative to prevent all forms of election fraud including vote buying and misused of public money and facilities by dynastic politicians. However, it requires a strong political will from related stakeholders.

Finally, the most famous adagium of democracy is “from the people, by the people, and to the people”. It implies that citizen has the highest authority to decide what is best for them. Voters need to examine closely and carefully the background, past performances and programs of each candidate. Voters need to critically evaluate each candidate, particularly those with dynastic backgrounds.  To do so, voters need access to complete information of competing candidates which nowadays is made possible by the presence of various information channels.

Beyond knowing and examining the candidate’s background and programs, voters need to do the actual vote. Skepticism toward the election process is counterproductive. Instead, activism is imperative not only during the election period but also afterwards. Oversight to government’s public policy and resource allocation is also pertinent. It is important not only to ensure that the elected leaders, whether dynastic or non-dynastic, do their job properly according to good governance principles, but also, more importantly, to provide continuous political education to a public lacking political maturity. Incessant political education will also create new potential leaders, which will constantly challenge the domination of dynastic politicians.

By doing so, potential voters in the future will have more comprehensive reference to select their leaders, particularly from dynastic politicians’ track records. The more they perform well, the stronger public’s positive collective cognition toward their family names. Family name will serve as a brand to those politicians. In the end, the public as customers will always choose the best brand, which has been proven to give them maximum benefit with minimum cost.

There is no instant way to prevent elites from creating political dynasties because democracy, in fact, allows them to do so. Prohibiting a particular person due to one’s background to enter political arena can be interpreted as violation against democratic principles. In this sense, we should return to the basic principle of democracy: free and fair competition in the election. Additionally, citizens’ active participation in the political process as well as continuous commitment to political education remains critical despite the high costs accrued.

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ASEAN 44th Anniversary: Fostering People-to-People Contact towards a Solid ASEAN Community

This year the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) celebrates its 44^th Anniversary. Forty-four years of living and maintaining peace and stability in one of the most dynamic regions in the world is a remarkable achievement for an association that was built in the midst of the Cold War.

However, as the Cold War came to an end, the forces of globalization and interdependence became something inevitable for most countries around the world, including ASEAN member countries. Therefore, to strengthen its cooperation and cohesion, they have decided to go further beyond its original form. ASEAN wants to make a solid community under the umbrella of the ASEAN Community, which consists of three pillars, namely: the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). The deadline set for the establishment of this new form of cooperation among Southeast Asian countries is 2015.

This article has been published by The Jakarta Post (August 14, 2011)

All three pillars have their own challenges toward 2015. This commentary will be focused on the last pillar, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community with emphasis on people-to-people interaction in the Southeast Asian region.  

People-to-People Contact: A Vital Factor for the Establishment of the ASEAN Community

The ASCC Blueprint has stated that building an ASEAN Identity is one of the characteristics of ASCC. Thus, the ASCC aims to promote awareness and the common values of ASEAN to its people, as well as to create a sense of belonging, mutual understanding, and togetherness. By doing so, ASEAN hopes that its citizens will give their full support towards the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015.

Citizens’ support is a vital precondition needed to establish a solid network and cooperation among ASEAN member countries. Without it, cooperation at the elite level will be “soulless” because their people, which are their ultimate reason to cooperate with each other, will not be aware of the cooperation’s benefits, and even bring pessimism and skepticism towards the cooperation. In short, without its citizens’ support, cooperation among the governments of Southeast Asia will be less effective, if not useless.

One of the many ways through which this support can be obtained is people-to-people contact. People-to-people contact can bring strong support for ASEAN governments to form any kind of positive cooperation among them. Through interactions citizens in ASEAN countries can get to know each other better, build mutual understanding, develop the sense that they are facing common problems, and ultimately seek for common solution to their problems. The latter is where governments play their role by cooperating with each other to create common policies or programs, which can be accepted and implemented by all members of ASEAN, because they are sure that it will bring benefits to its people.

People-to-people interaction does not necessarily mean direct interaction (though it is the most effective way). Indirect interaction through various channels such as the mass media, online community, or through social networking media like Facebook and Twitter can be alternatives to bridge communication among Southeast Asians.

Interaction among ASEAN citizens is still very low. There are indeed so many meetings, policies, and programs already carried out with the aim to increase interaction between ASEAN citizens, some examples include the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Youth (AMMY), the ASEAN Committee on Women, the ASEAN Education Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Foundation’s programs, the ASCC Blueprint, free social visit visa for citizens of ASEAN countries (except in several member countries), and many other forms of cooperation. In essence, Governments of ASEAN countries are trying their best to serve the needs of ASEAN people.

However, most Southeast Asians are still not aware about those meetings, policies, and programs. The reason is that there are not so many and intensive news coverage on ASEAN issues or intensive socialization and dissemination of information carried out the government to the general public.

With only four years left to go until 2015, people-to-people interaction to increase social cohesion among Southeast Asians needs to be accelerated. Otherwise, ASEAN Community 2015 will only be like most ASEAN cooperation in the past. It ended at the elite level and the people are left behind.

Some Suggestions to Increase People-to-People Contact

Some solutions can be suggested to foster people-to-people interaction in the region.

First, considering mass media is one of the most effective channels to disseminate information to broader audiences, the governments of Southeast Asia need to be more focused on efforts to embrace and engage with the mass media in ASEAN countries. Thus, intensive, innovative, and integrated media relations programs need to be developed immediately. Intense engagement of the media could evoke them or the press community to write more about ASEAN.

Second, the governments of Southeast Asia need to increase the number of activities such as youth exchange and youth camp, teacher or lecturer exchange, and other activities that could provide direct interaction among community leaders or opinion makers from ASEAN member countries. Those activities should be evaluated from time to time and networks built among the participants should be maintained.

Third, the governments of Southeast Asia need to provide more support to the non-government and private sector’ efforts which would help to promote people-to-people interaction among ASEAN citizens. If the governments cannot support in terms of funding, they can at least facilitate and provide easy access to their needs to cooperate with partner institutions from other ASEAN member countries. 

Finally, the governments of Southeast Asia need to utilize the power of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Flickr, or other media to generate support from ASEAN people. These social media can be employed and they are powerful tools for people to get to know each other better, exchange ideas, share experience, and seek for common solutions.

Hopefully, by 2015, ASEAN can establish a solid ASEAN Community with the full support of its citizens who share the same idea: “Think, Feel, and Act ASEAN”. Congratulations ASEAN.

Published in Jakarta Post

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