Interpreting the Constitutional Court’s Decision

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia (MK) has just announced its verdict on two regulations in Law No. 8 of 2012 on General Elections to elect Members of Parliament at the national (DPR), provincial (DPRD Provinsi), as well as district or municipality level (DPRD Kabupaten/ Kota). The first verdict is that all political parties, including already existing ones, must pass a verification process set by the General Election Commission (KPU) in order to compete in the next election. Secondly, the 3.5 percent Parliamentary threshold (PT) will only be applicable for DPR but not for both DPRD Provinsi and Kabupaten/Kota.

This article argues that the Court’s decision is vital in supporting Indonesia’s democratic consolidation process. In particular, the decision will improve not only the quality of the party system, which will improve party institutionalization, thus strengthening the linkage between voters and political parties.

Equal and fair verification process

There are three reasons for why all parties should undergo the verification process. First, it encourages political parties to improve party institutionalization. With this requirement, political parties will have to prove that they are maintaining their “systemness”, which according to Randall and Svåsand (2002) is “… the increasing scope, density, and regularity of the interactions that constitute the party as a structure.” It requires existing political parties to build better party machinery and circumvent the skeletal-survivability strategy as commonly practiced. However, this verification is only tackling one of the issues in party institutionalization. The other factors, including value infusion, decisional autonomy, and reification, will need more than a verification process.

The second reason is that the verification process provides a fair barrier for opportunistic political entrepreneurs to make new parties every election with insignificant public support. In the new election law, the requirements for a political party to be able to compete in the next election are more stringent than the previous law. For instance, the requirement for a political party to have structural branches with higher magnitude, which varies from the national to sub-district level, is actually difficult to achieve for a party without deep-rooted support and vast resources. Subsequently, a political party with a good party institutionalization should not be worried about this regulation, because it will be easy for the party to surpass the requirement. However, one should note that the effectiveness of the verification process as a barrier for political entrepreneurs will depend on the performance of the General Election Committee (KPU).

The third reason, as argued by the Court, is that it provides an equal playing field for all political parties. Non-discriminatory treatment to all subjects of democracy is an essential value of a democratic system. The Court has correctly pointed out that it would be unfair if the existing parties do not have to go through the verification because, as mentioned earlier, the requirement in the new law is more stringent.

A dilemma between proportionality and simplification of party system

Regarding the PT, the Court annulled the regulation for the implementation of 3.5 percent PT at the DPRD level, as well as at both provincial and district/ municipality level. However, the 3.5 percent PT for the DPR is still applicable. The Court argued that it understands that PT is necessary to simplify the party system. However, Indonesian plurality and political aspirations at the regional level are also important and must to be taken into account.

            Ideally, there should be no PT at both the national and regional levels because the verification process ought to simplify the party system. Again, only parties with good institutionalization and sufficient resources can compete in elections. One should remember that the requirement for a party to enter elections is applied both at the national and regional level. Thus, only parties with national coverage can also compete at the regional level. Subsequently, it will discourage minor parties from entering elections, not because of discrimination of PT, but because they cannot pass the requirements in verification process.

However, the Court’s decision on PT should be appreciated as an effort to accommodate both interests. By allowing a PT of 3.5 percent at the national level, it will become a filter for smaller parties that only have strong bases in several areas but do not have nation-wide support. At the same time, smaller parties will still be able to represent their strong bases at the regional Parliament, which is more relevant with regard to their ties and proximity with their bases of support at that particular region.

In this context, it supports one of the vital elements of democracy, which is interest optimization. Alan Ware (1987) suggested that formal arrangement in a democracy should optimally correspond to the interests of the largest number of people in the relevant arena. The DPR and DPRD operate on different levels. Therefore, the degree of representativeness between both institutions is also different. A strong party at the regional level in each particular province or district/municipality does not necessarily represent the interests of the voters at the national level. Therefore, the application of PT for DPR is acceptable.

Endnote

The MK’s verdict has the potential to improve the stability of the party system in Indonesia. More importantly, it could also improve the linkage between political parties and their voters, who are constantly being questioned in Indonesia’s multiparty system in the post-Suharto era.

However, despite the efforts to improve the quality of electoral laws and system by the MK, DPR, the Government, and civil societies, the KPU as the executioner plays a vital role in determining the quality of elections in Indonesia.

Indonesia’s electoral law might be one of most complicated laws in the world. Despite its shortcomings, current electoral laws are suitable for a country like Indonesia. Maybe now is the time for the world to learn from Indonesia.

Yoes C. Kenawas is a graduate student and research analyst at the Indonesia Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of InternationalStudies (RSIS), Singapore. The opinions expressed are his own.

Which one threatens the state, Lady Gaga or hardliners?

The Jakarta Post Tue, May 22 2012

The National Police (Polri) stated that they would not issue a permit for Lady Gaga’s concert scheduled for Jakarta on June 3, 2012, for, among other reasons, fears that the Grammy Award winner would exploit her sensuality in a manner which could harm the moral of Indonesian youths.

This statement is more or less in line with the same tune as that of the Islam Defenders Front (FPI), which previously said that Lady Gaga would “bring the faith of Satan to the country and thus would destroy the nation’s morals” (The Jakarta Post, May 16, 2012). 

Whether the police’s decision is right or wrong does not matter. The most serious problem, however, lies in the fact that a small group of people can influence the process of interpreting threats within a state institution like the police by using their “religious” agenda. It is interesting to notice that in post-Soeharto Indonesia, state institutions are submissive, if not controlled, by some hard-line groups in this republic. 

In a democratic country, the power of the state comes from the people’s votes through elections. In this context, the state should never discriminate against its citizens when a conflict erupts between such groups. Instead, the state remains neutral and adherent to the Constitution and law when managing the differences among conflicting parties. The state, through law enforcement institutions, has the power to maintain public order and security, enforce the law, provide protection and serve the public interests. State institutions have the mandate to take action to keep the public interests from all forms of threat.

There are several types of threats, namely direct and indirect as well as actual and potential threats. However, threats are also about perception, particularly if we talk about threats on the level of concepts or ideas. 

Because the public is not a single entity, threats directed at a particular group are not necessarily a threat against another group. In this case, the law enforcement agencies, e.g., the police, should carefully assess each type of threat, whether actual or potential, direct or indirect; which party or group that will be harmed by the threat; and how it will affect society as a whole. Therefore, they can take necessary actions based on the threat assessment. Nevertheless, the police must handle each assessment in a careful manner. Miscalculating the threat could send the wrong signal to the general public.

In the case of Lady Gaga’s concert and Irshad Manji’s book launching, as well as in other cases such as GKI Yasmin Christian congregation or Ahmadiyah Islamic minority sect, state institutions seemed to fall under the influence or are unable to deal with threats that come from religious hardliner groups. 

In those cases, the hardliner groups clearly stated that they would launch physical attacks on other parties. Through their actions, the hardliners were actually presenting more potential, and in some cases, actual threats to other groups. 

The irony, however, is that state institutions, which ideally must stay neutral to protect the well-being of all people, are aligning with the hardliner groups. Instead of overcoming potential threats, the state apparatus chooses to cooperate with the side that has launched the threat. 

The state in post-Soeharto Indonesia has been co-opted by some groups that are capable of influencing state policy through various means, including threats.

It is indeed the irony of democracy that they freely increase their power and consequently influence and determine the state’s policy. The most concerning issue is not necessarily their threat to attack others, but their attack on the freedom of expression and pluralism, which characterizes the nation.

Worse, they can promote their agenda by intimidating the state. If the state does not comply with their demands, for example, the ban against Lady Gaga’s performance, they will not hesitate to intimidate others, including state institutions. 

For whatever reason, including maintenance of public order, the police’s option to accommodate the threat rather than to overcome it is a stark display of a thug-controlled state. It constitutes the tyranny of a minority over the majority. In the end, it will jeopardize Indonesia’s reputation as a democracy. Indonesia’s billing as the third largest democracy in the world will be just a myth, or actually, democracy is already new myth of Indonesia. 

Indonesia today is watching the radical groups win another battle-of-discourse over those who are supporting democracy, freedom of speech and plurality. The country needs someone like Gus Dur who dared to challenge the hardliner’s agenda. 

As long as the state complies with particular groups’ agenda, then it is hard to deny that Indonesia is transforming into a homogenous society. It depends on Indonesian society whether or not they are determined to advance plurality. 

The writer is a post-graduate student at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Jakarta Election and Indonesia in 2014: An Election Reflection

Synopsis

The first round of Jakarta gubernatorial election has just ended. There are several crucial issues in this stage, which can give us a preview of the 2014 election in Indonesia.

Commentary

On 11 July 2012, Jakarta residents voted for Jakarta’s Governor for the next five years. Based on the final vote tabulations by the Jakarta General Election Commission (KPUD Jakarta), the pair of Surakarta Mayor Joko Widodo (Jokowi) - Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) finished at the first place, followed by the incumbent Fauzi Bowo (Foke) – Nachrowi Ramli (Nara) with about 1.8 million votes and 1.4 million votes subsequently. Yet, none of them was able to get the majority votes. Thus, they will compete in the runoff on 21 September 2012.

However, there are several lessons that we can learn from the first round, primarily in the light of Indonesian legislative and presidential election in 2014.

Weak party, more personal appeal

First, there is an indication that both in Jakarta and at the national level, political parties’ machinery remains ineffective in mobilizing voters. Although the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP) and the Indonesia Greater Movement Party (Gerindra) claimed that their cadres were working very hard to mobilize voters, one could suggest that it is Jokowi’s low-profile character which, supported by extensive media coverage, was the key factor in his success. However, based on the exit poll, we cannot just ignore the role of the PDIP and Gerindra, whereby about 79 percent of voters for both parties voted for Jokowi - Ahok.

Nevertheless, weak party machinery was observable with other political party-backed candidates. 44.9 percent of the Democratic Party (PD) voters voted for other candidates, not for the pair of Foke-Nara. The most evident is the pair of Alex Noerdin - Nono Sampono, whereby only 19 percent of Golkar’s voters voted for them, while the rest of the party’s voters voted for other candidates.

In other words, personal appeal is still playing a great role in the success of candidates rather than strong party machinery or programmatic approach. It is related to the issue of party institutionalization. Declining party ID, weak party machinery, and public pragmatism have contributed toward the emergence of this characteristic.

National-level leadership: out of stock

The second issue related to the issue of the number of high-qualified potential leaders. In Jakarta elections, there are six pairs of candidates competing to become the Governor of Jakarta. Apart from the incumbent, all of the candidates are “new faces” to Jakarta residents.  They all have, arguably, the best qualities to lead a very dynamic province like Jakarta. The incumbent, Fauzi Bowo, is an experienced bureaucrat who served his entire career in Jakarta. The contenders, Joko Widodo is a candidate for World’s Best Mayor; Hidayat Nurwahid is a statesman who once led the National Consultative Assembly (MPR); Faisal Basri is a leading yet humble economist, well known for his ability to conceptualize ideas and translate them into practical solutions; Alex Noerdin is the Governor of South Sumatera who is able to carry out various monumental projects; and Hendardji Soepandji is a former military general with a good track record, well known for being clean and idealist. Those candidates are crème de la crème and have the potential to carry out their duties as the leader of Jakarta.

On the contrary, at the national level, Indonesia seems to be running out of stock of national leadership. Most of the candidates are “old faces” that already existed since the New Order era. Some of the names that appeared in some surveys ran in the previous presidential elections. Some others even have direct relations with previous or current leaders. As for new faces such as the State Owned Enterprises Minister Dahlan Iskan or Coordinating Minister for Politics, Legal, and Security Affairs Djoko Suyanto, despite appearing in the surveys, these leaders still have a low level of popularity amongst Indonesian. It would be best if Indonesia could follow the case of Jakarta, whereby the best talent and new faces are daring enough to compete in the election.

Election management: same old song

By reflecting on the Jakarta election, Indonesia is still coping with critical issues regarding election management quality. The issue of voter lists is the most important among others. Even for a major city like Jakarta, voter lists are still disorganized and have rendered many eligible voters unable to enjoy their constitutional rights. It is a continuing issue, which happens from one election to another both at the regional and national level.

The Jakarta election could be very good evaluation material for the National Election Commission (KPU) to overcome their shortcomings in the next two years, leading to a better election in 2014 than in 2009. The implementation of the electronic identification card (E-KTP) could be helpful to minimize voter lists issue in the next election.

Political marketing: going digital

The fourth issue is related with the utilization of social media in political campaign. From Jakarta election we can see an increasing trend of using the social media platforms as a contrivance for candidates to promote their programs, create a good image, or even using it to launch black campaign against the competitors. It happens particularly in the Twitter.

It also became the impetus for the birth of new actors in shaping the political discourse, which commonly called as celebritweet or celebtwit (celebrity on Twitter). To put it short, they are some accounts on Twitter who has high number of followers and acting as like a marketing buzzer. Some of them are personal accounts and others are pseudonym accounts, who managed by one or several people. Some of them are voluntarily basis; some others are professionally paid “social media consultants.”

Although it is too early to conclude that they significantly influenced the campaign, but the trend shows that it is crucial for candidates to run their campaign on the social media. It is relevant due to increasing number of social media and internet user in Indonesia. Therefore, in 2014, although the backbone of political marketing is still the traditional media outlets, but there is a tendency that social media will play a greater role in shaping the dynamics in a political campaign in Indonesia.

Yoes C. Kenawas is a Research Analyst at the IndonesiaProgramme of the S. Rajaratnam of International Studies, Singapore.

Political Islam in Indonesia: More Conservative, But Not Necessarily Support Neo-Islamist

This article is a response to Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman's article titled "The Future of Islamism in Indonesia: Neo-or- post Islamism?” Mr. Osman's article has carefully analyzed the current situation of Islamism in Indonesia and positively contributed to the discussion of political Islam in the world's largest Muslim country. Furthermore, he has argued that neo-Islamist movements, led by HTI and FUI, would continue to grow in Indonesia because of their ability in building social capital amongst state institutions as well as in attracting young Islamists who are "disappointed" by compromises made by Islamist political parties.

However, before we conclude that neo-Islamist movements will continue to grow and reshape Indonesia’s political scene, several considerations must be taken into account. This will provide us with a more comprehensive perspective for analyzing this development.  

Declining Electoral Support, Increasing Conservatism

Saiful Mujani and William R. Liddle have argued that electoral support towards Islamic political parties in Indonesia is declining from one election to another. One can see the decline by looking at Islamic political party support over the last two election cycles, whereby support towards all Islamic political parties in the 2004 and 2009 elections were only 40 percent and 25 percent respectively. The latest survey conducted by CSIS in January 2012 shows that support toward Islamic political parties such as the Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) is declining significantly from 7.8 percent to only 3.1 percent. The same is happening with the United Development Party (PPP).

However, as argued by Anies Baswedan and Sunny Tanuwidjadja, while electoral support towards Islamic political parties is declining, political Islam has actually been rising in recent years. There is a penetration of Islamic forces into so-called nationalist, secular, and Pancasila-based political parties. For example, most of these political parties have recently supported a number of laws that contain Islamic values, both at the national and regional level.

Furthermore, recent events in Indonesia have also indicated that the penetration of political Islam is increasing and is able to force the government to accommodate their demands. Irshad Manji’s book tour, Lady Gaga’s concert, the Cikeusik Massacre, and the Yasmin Congregation’s church are all examples showing that the government is willing to make compromises to meet demands of several hardliner groups in Indonesia. The joint ministerial decree on the Ahmadiyah is an example whereby the government has bent under pressure of Islamic hardliner groups.

Additionally, the Jakarta Post also reported that according to the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), trends show that radicals have gained positions in mosque management, which have traditionally been held by followers of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Moreover, the survey by the Institution for Islam and Peace Studies (LaKIP) also shows that there are significant numbers of Indonesian students who were willing to become involved in acts of religious violence as well as in vandalizing houses of worship of other religious believers.

These facts confirm that Indonesian Muslims are becoming more conservative. Nevertheless, does this support the claim that Neo-Islamist groups are also increasing in Indonesia?

Several Considerations

Before we answer that question, there are several factors that need to be taken into account regarding whom Muslims in Indonesia will channel their supports to in order to accommodate its values and demands.

First, the phenomenon of declining party ID is not solely the problem of Islamist political parties. Current trends show that party ID is declining in most political parties in Indonesia. It is also indicated in the number of swing voters in Indonesia. CSIS' survey shows that there are 48.4 percent voters who have not decided yet which party that they will select if elections were to be held today.

Political parties have disappointed Indonesian voters due to corruption and scandals that implicated their cadres. Based on LSI’s survey in December 2011, political parties were viewed as the most corrupt political institution in Indonesia – a factor that lowers party ID. Some scandals also involved several politicians from Islamic political parties. For example the case of Arifinto (PKS) who was caught on camera watching a pornographic video during the plenary session, or the case of Misbakhun, also from PKS, who was found guilty of crafting a fictitious mortgage letter to obtain credit.

Second, when they lost their confidence in political parties, there are other alternatives for Muslims in Indonesia to channel their voices other than through neo-Islamist groups. In this case, we will be focusing on the voters of Islamic political parties. First, as suggested by Mr. Osman, voters may go to organizations such as FUI or HTI. However, we also should bear in mind that there are also other more moderate organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah where Muslims can channel their aspirations. Second, the voters might choose other political parties which suit their values, needs, aspirations or simply because of the personal appeal of the party’s leader. This could mean that they would choose non-Islamic parties or secular-nationalist political parties. Third, they may not use their right to vote and become passive during the election, becoming what is known as golput (white group) in Indonesia.

Third, we also have to consider the fact that youth are not overly interested in politics. A survey conducted by LSI, Goethe Institut, and Friedrich Naumann Foundation shows that the majority of Muslim youths are not interested in politics. Nevertheless, they also show a high degree of trust in democracy and democratic institutions, which could mean democracy, is seen as the only game in town. Changes should be done in a democratic way.

Although the social pendulum is moving towards a more conservative stance, Indonesian Muslims are still in the moderate quadrant. As long as nationalist political parties and leaders still accommodate some Islamic values and can present strong governance and leadership, the issue of establishing an Islamic country is no longer relevant for Muslims in Indonesia. They might be more conservative, but not necessarily want to change the country’s ideology and turn Indonesia into an Islamic state.

Yoes C. Kenawas is a Research Analyst at the Indonesia Programme of the S. Rajaratnam ofInternational Studies, Singapore.