This article is a response to Mohamed Nawab
Mohamed Osman's article titled "The Future of Islamism in Indonesia: Neo-or- post Islamism?” Mr. Osman's article has carefully analyzed the current
situation of Islamism in Indonesia and positively contributed to the discussion
of political Islam in the world's largest Muslim country. Furthermore, he has argued
that neo-Islamist movements, led by HTI and FUI, would continue to grow in
Indonesia because of their ability in building social capital amongst state institutions
as well as in attracting young Islamists who are "disappointed" by
compromises made by Islamist political parties.
However, before we conclude that neo-Islamist
movements will continue to grow and reshape Indonesia’s political scene,
several considerations must be taken into account. This will provide us with a more comprehensive
perspective for analyzing this development.
Declining Electoral
Support, Increasing Conservatism
Saiful Mujani and William R. Liddle have argued
that electoral support towards Islamic political parties in Indonesia is
declining from one election to another. One can see the decline by looking at
Islamic political party support over the last two election cycles, whereby
support towards all Islamic political parties in the 2004 and 2009 elections
were only 40 percent and 25 percent respectively. The latest survey conducted
by CSIS in January 2012 shows that support toward Islamic political parties
such as the Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) is declining significantly from
7.8 percent to only 3.1 percent. The same is happening with the United
Development Party (PPP).
However, as argued by Anies Baswedan and Sunny
Tanuwidjadja, while electoral support towards Islamic political parties is
declining, political Islam has actually been rising in recent years. There is a
penetration of Islamic forces into so-called nationalist, secular, and
Pancasila-based political parties. For example, most of these political parties
have recently supported a number of laws that contain Islamic values, both at
the national and regional level.
Furthermore, recent events in Indonesia have also
indicated that the penetration of political Islam is increasing and is able to
force the government to accommodate their demands. Irshad Manji’s book tour,
Lady Gaga’s concert, the Cikeusik Massacre, and the Yasmin Congregation’s
church are all examples showing that the government is willing to make compromises
to meet demands of several hardliner groups in Indonesia. The joint ministerial
decree on the Ahmadiyah is an example whereby the government has bent under pressure
of Islamic hardliner groups.
Additionally, the Jakarta Post also reported
that according to the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), trends show that
radicals have gained positions in mosque management, which have traditionally been
held by followers of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Moreover, the
survey by the Institution for Islam and Peace Studies (LaKIP) also shows that
there are significant numbers of Indonesian students who were willing to become
involved in acts of religious violence as well as in vandalizing houses of
worship of other religious believers.
These facts confirm that Indonesian Muslims are
becoming more conservative. Nevertheless, does this support the claim that Neo-Islamist
groups are also increasing in Indonesia?
Several Considerations
Before we answer that question, there are
several factors that need to be taken into account regarding whom Muslims in
Indonesia will channel their supports to in order to accommodate its values and
demands.
First, the phenomenon of declining party ID is
not solely the problem of Islamist political parties. Current trends show that
party ID is declining in most political parties in Indonesia. It is also
indicated in the number of swing voters in Indonesia. CSIS' survey shows that
there are 48.4 percent voters who have not decided yet which party that they
will select if elections were to be held today.
Political parties have disappointed Indonesian
voters due to corruption and scandals that implicated their cadres. Based on
LSI’s survey in December 2011, political parties were viewed as the most
corrupt political institution in Indonesia – a factor that lowers party ID.
Some scandals also involved several politicians from Islamic political parties.
For example the case of Arifinto (PKS) who was caught on camera watching a pornographic
video during the plenary session, or the case of Misbakhun, also from PKS, who was
found guilty of crafting a fictitious mortgage letter to obtain credit.
Second, when they lost their confidence in
political parties, there are other alternatives for Muslims in Indonesia to
channel their voices other than through neo-Islamist groups. In this case, we
will be focusing on the voters of Islamic political parties. First, as
suggested by Mr. Osman, voters may go to organizations such as FUI or HTI.
However, we also should bear in mind that there are also other more moderate
organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah where Muslims can channel their
aspirations. Second, the voters might choose other political parties which suit
their values, needs, aspirations or simply because of the personal appeal of
the party’s leader. This could mean that they would choose non-Islamic parties
or secular-nationalist political parties. Third, they may not use their right
to vote and become passive during the election, becoming what is known as golput (white group) in Indonesia.
Third, we also have to consider the fact that
youth are not overly interested in politics. A survey conducted by LSI, Goethe
Institut, and Friedrich Naumann Foundation shows that the majority of Muslim
youths are not interested in politics. Nevertheless, they also show a high
degree of trust in democracy and democratic institutions, which could mean democracy,
is seen as the only game in town. Changes should be done in a democratic way.
Although the social pendulum is moving towards
a more conservative stance, Indonesian Muslims are still in the moderate
quadrant. As long as nationalist political parties and leaders still
accommodate some Islamic values and can present strong governance and
leadership, the issue of establishing an Islamic country is no longer relevant
for Muslims in Indonesia. They might be more conservative, but not necessarily
want to change the country’s ideology and turn Indonesia into an Islamic state.
Yoes C. Kenawas is a
Research Analyst at the Indonesia Programme of the S. Rajaratnam ofInternational Studies, Singapore.
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