Wednesday, 4 January 2012

Political Dynasties in Indonesia: What Went Wrong?

As predicted, several Indonesian survey institutions announced that the pair of Ratu Atut Choisiah (incumbent) – Rano Karno (deputy regent of Tangerang) would win the 2011 Banten gubernatorial election. At the time this article is written, the Provincial General Election Commission has yet to announce the final result of the election.

However, the return of Ratu Atut to political office raises concerns about the monopoly of power concentrated in small groups of elite. Ratu Atut’s relatives hold several key public positions throughout Banten province. Furthermore, it raises the issue of political dynasties in post-Suharto Indonesia.  Banten is not exclusive, but the pattern is also evident in other provinces and at the national level. Dynastic politicians have occupied key positions in the public office positions as well as within the political party structure.

Political dynasty is, in fact, not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Families such as the Sukarnos and Suhartos were very dominant in Indonesia politics. However, currently more families are rising at the national and local political stage.

The proliferation of political dynasties in Indonesia is inevitable. In a democratic society like India, the Philippines, including Indonesia the issue is not about how we prevent the formation of political dynasties, but how we prevent them from violating principles of democracy when obtaining political positions. In countries like Indonesia, the issue of political dynasties formation becomes more important because it could jeopardize the prospect of democratic consolidation. In addition, in the situation where there are pervasive structural defects in the current democracy practice, this phenomenon is not favorable to make Indonesian democracy become more mature in the long run. It could setback the ongoing process because public’s expectation towards a more equal distribution of power, after a long period of centralized authoritarian government, could be distorted. Optimism could turn into pessimism.

According to Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder (2009), democracy, in fact, provides the ground for political elites to centralize power in small groups of people. In a democratic society, each citizen has the same rights to pursue one’s political objectives. Better political capital, such as extensive elite and grassroots networks, brand name recognition, and presumably, opportunity to exploit public budget and facilities for their campaigns, provides a better chance for those dynastic politicians to defeat their non-dynastic competitors.

It is indeed an irony that democracy, allows centralization of power in small groups of elite. It opposes the original idea of democracy, which seeks to avoid power agglomeration in small groups of people. Democratic transformation, followed by democratic consolidation, are expected to prevent centralization of power in one or small of groups of political elite i.e. oligarchs. Having said that, what went wrong?

In fact, there is nothing wrong with the creation of political dynasties. It is inevitable and not against the principle of democracy as long as contending politicians respect the essential values of democracy. The problem arises when the process to form dynasties violates other principles of democracy. Therefore, there are three issues that need to be addressed in order to prevent dynastic politicians from violating democratic principles.

First, political parties are responsible to select and nominate its best cadre to compete in the election. Good selection and monitoring mechanisms of political parties will be beneficial not only to the voter but also, in the long-run, to the party itself. It will become the first controlling mechanism to prevent dynastic politicians to violate democratic principle. Therefore, political parties need to strengthen the mechanism of caderisation.

However, looking at current condition of political parties in Indonesia, whereby money politics and patron-client relations are still the main features in their political decision making, it would hard to see any progress in developing control mechanism in foreseeable future. In addition, it will only be effective if dynastic politicians use party as its main vehicle to nominate him/her. It will be useless if dynastic politicians choose to run as independent candidate. It leads us to see other available alternatives to prevent dynastic politicians to undermine the principles of democracy.

Minimum requirement for democracy is the presence of free and fair elections. Indonesia has conducted three general elections (including two direct presidential elections) and numerous local level elections. However, the fairness of those elections remain questioned. In 2010, the Constitutional Court handled 230 election disputes out of 240 elections across Indonesia. Many of them related to money politics, public official mobilization, to final voter register fraud.

In this sense, strengthening the coordination among the Election Oversight Committee, Election Commission and Indonesian police, both at national and local level, is vital and urgent. These agencies, must take serious action toward election frauds, which are potentially conducted by all competing candidates. However, due to the incumbency status and distinctive advantages of dynastic politicians, related agencies need to be more aware to potential violations they may conduct. Law enforcement is a feasible alternative to prevent all forms of election fraud including vote buying and misused of public money and facilities by dynastic politicians. However, it requires a strong political will from related stakeholders.

Finally, the most famous adagium of democracy is “from the people, by the people, and to the people”. It implies that citizen has the highest authority to decide what is best for them. Voters need to examine closely and carefully the background, past performances and programs of each candidate. Voters need to critically evaluate each candidate, particularly those with dynastic backgrounds.  To do so, voters need access to complete information of competing candidates which nowadays is made possible by the presence of various information channels.
Beyond knowing and examining the candidate’s background and programs, voters need to do the actual vote. Skepticism toward the election process is counterproductive. Instead, activism is imperative not only during the election period but also afterwards. Oversight to government’s public policy and resource allocation is also pertinent. It is important not only to ensure that the elected leaders, whether dynastic or non-dynastic, do their job properly according to good governance principles, but also, more importantly, to provide continuous political education to a public lacking political maturity. Incessant political education will also create new potential leaders, which will constantly challenge the domination of dynastic politicians.

By doing so, potential voters in the future will have more comprehensive reference to select their leaders, particularly from dynastic politicians’ track records. The more they perform well, the stronger public’s positive collective cognition toward their family names. Family name will serve as a brand to those politicians. In the end, the public as customers will always choose the best brand, which has been proven to give them maximum benefit with minimum cost.

There is no instant way to prevent elites from creating political dynasties because democracy, in fact, allows them to do so. Prohibiting a particular person due to one’s background to enter political arena can be interpreted as violation against democratic principles. In this sense, we should return to the basic principle of democracy: free and fair competition in the election. Additionally, citizens’ active participation in the political process as well as continuous commitment to political education remains critical despite the high costs accrued.

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